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Merger Actions for Damages
By HERBERT HOVENKAMP*
Mergers can have two different economic effects, one harmful to
society and the other beneficial. A merger may give the post-merger
firm more market power' than that enjoyed by either pre-merger firm,
encouraging reduced output and higher prices for consumers. 2 For this
reason, some mergers are illegal under the antitrust laws. Yet a merger
may also benefit society by increasing the efficiency 3 of the post-merger
firm. Increased efficiency generally results in lower costs and lower
consumer prices. Even these efficiency gains cause private injuries,
however, and may yield antitrust lawsuits for damages.
The very idea of a private damages action for an illegal merger is
problematic. Perhaps for this reason, most actions challenging mergers
under section 7 of the Clayton Act4 historically have been brought by
either the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ).5 The substantive law of mergers strongly suggests that
these public agencies are the optimal enforcers of section 7. Section 7 is
an "incipiency" statute. It was designed to nip in the bud not merely
mergers that create immediate market power, but also mergers that
may do so at some future time.6 A perplexing, ongoing problem of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Market power means the power to restrict output in the market to less than the pre-
merger level and to make a profit by doing so.
2. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS & FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 1.2-1.3
(1985).
3. As the term is used here, a change is "efficient" if the amount gained by all who
gain from the change is greater than the amount lost by all those who lose. For a discussion
of efficiency and antitrust policy, see R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 92 (1981);
Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 15 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 8-12
(1982).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
5. In recent years there have been about as many private filings as there have been
filings by the DOJ and the FTC. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, MERGERS AND THE PRI-
VATE ANTITRUST SUIT: THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT,
POLICY AND LAW 43, 106-12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC.].
6. See Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962) (stating that the 1950
Celler-Kefauver amendments to § 7 were a "provision of authority for arresting mergers at a
time when the trend to a lessening of competition. . . was still in its incipiency. before
it gathered momentum").
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antitrust policy is whether private plaintiffs should have the power to
enforce such a statute and, if so, whether they should have the benefit
of this same "incipiency" test. Importantly, if an action in such a case
involves a claim for damages, what pecuniary injury can the plaintiff
show? For example, in the big Warren Court horizontal merger cases,
such as Brown Shoe7 and Von's Grocery,8 the government presented no
credible argument that these mergers, which created firms with market
shares of roughly 5% to 8%, permitted the defendants to reap monopoly
profits. Instead, the Court relied on a "trend" toward concentration
which, if allowed to continue, might eventually produce firms with
market power.9 In such cases a private plaintiff clearly cannot show
damages based on a post-merger monopoly overcharge. At best there
is only a threat of future monopoly pricing if the merger trend contin-
ues. Perhaps private plaintiffs in such cases can show a different kind
of pecuniary injury, but then a court should consider whether section 7
is the best mechanism for dealing with such claims.
These concerns once led some federal courts to conclude that there
should be no private damages action for violations of section 7. l° To-
day, however, courts routinely permit such actions. The current in-
7. Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
8. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 394 U.S. 270 (1966).
9. Id at 277-78; Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 346. See also United States v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (condemning a horizontal merger creating a post-merger firm with
less than 6% of the market).
10. See, e.g., Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725, 728 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1964); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 717 (D. Ha-
waii 1964), afdper curiam, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969).
But see Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F. Supp. 72, 88 (D. Hawaii 1969).
11. See, e.g., Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 940 (1976); Carlson Co. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 507 F.2d 959 (8th
Cir. 1974); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
938 (1973); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 911 (1971); Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); see
also Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1130
n.20 (1976); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC., supra note 5, at 77. See generally Day, Private Acions
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 29 ANTITRUST L.J. 155 (1965); Graybeal, Standing and
Relie/ in Private Section 7 Cases, 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 561 (1973); Kintner & Wilberding,
Enforcement of the Merger Laws by Private Party Litigation, 47 IND. L.J. 293 (1972).
The Supreme Court has never decided whether § 7 supports a private damages action,
although it appears to have so assumed. In Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey
Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965), the Supreme Court considered whether the statute
of limitations had been tolled in a damages action based on alleged violations of §§ I and 2
of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act. The Court held that the action could pro-
ceed; however, the presence of the Sherman Act claims meant that the Court did not need to
decide the legitimacy of the § 7 claim. See also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 n.15 (1977) (disapproving the plaintiffs theory of recovery but sug-
gesting in dicta that private damages actions in merger cases are permissible).
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terpretation is certainly more consistent with the language of the
relevant statutes. Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits persons injured
"by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"' 12 to sue for
treble damages. Because section 7 is part of the "antitrust laws," the
conclusion seems inescapable that Congress intended to permit private
damages actions for violations of section 7.13
Nevertheless, an unrestricted private right to damages under sec-
tion 7 creates a grave risk of deterring socially useful mergers. Private
parties may be motivated to sue under section 7 for injuries resulting
from the efficiency effects of a merger, despite the fact that those effi-
ciencies are beneficial to society as a whole. If the purpose of antitrust
law is to maximize consumer welfare by encouraging efficiency in the
production and the allocation of resources, private actions for damages
under section 7 should be limited to those plaintiffs who are injured by
12. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
13. See Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 989 n.21 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978) ("We see no escape from the logic that § 7 of the
Clayton Act is an antitrust statute within the scope and meaning of § 4 of the Act and so
hold.") (quoting Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 1967)).
Had Congress desired to deny private parties actions for damages under § 7, it could
have done so. One alternative to a private damages action is the private plaintiffs right to
an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982). Although a merger may
create no immediate market power but only the prospect of future market power, § 16 ex-
plicitly provides for private injunctive relief "against threatened loss or damage by a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws, including section . . .[7] of this title." Private injunctive relief
raises serious difficulties, however, if the merger has already occurred. In such a situation,
the private plaintiff normally seeks divestiture, that is, a judicially mandated restructuring of
the market. A post-merger divestiture often yields only a very poor approximation of pre-
merger market conditions. See Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
356 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (temporary injunction
less burdensome than potential future divestiture); In re Hooker Chem. Corp., 59 F.T.C. 254
(1961) (parties entered into a consent order to cease and desist and to divest); see also Elz-
inga, The Antimerger Law" Pyrrhic Victories 12 J.L. & ECON. 43 (1969) (concluding that
divestiture orders should be thorough in order to effectuate the policies of antimerger law);
Pfunder, Plaine & Whittemore, Compliance with Divestiture Orders Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act: An Analpsis of the Relie/ Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 19 (1972) (questioning
the effectiveness of divestiture as a remedy).
The circuit courts are split on the issue of whether divestiture is available as a private
remedy in a case brought under § 7 of the Clayton Act. Compare International Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. General Tel. & Tel. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 1975) (remedy not available),
with Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. Dic Concrete Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1016, 1025 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (remedy available); andCredit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp.
780, 797 (S.D. Tex. 1971), af'd, 476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1973) (remedy available). See gener-
ally Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits under Section 16 ofthe Clayton Act, 48 TEx. L. REV. 54
(1969) (concluding remedy should be available); Note, The Use of Divestiture in Private Anti-
trust Suits, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261 (1974) (concluding remedy should be available).
The Supreme Court's most explicit discussion of the issue is ambiguous. See Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 491 (1977).
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the post-merger firm's increased market power, and should not be
given to those who are injured solely by the firm's increased efficiency.
This Article examines the relationship between the public and the
purely private injuries that can be caused by illegal mergers. It analyzes
the efficiency defense as a means of limiting private actions to cases in
which the plaintiff is injured by the market power effects of a merger.
Such a defense would permit the defendant to show that the efficiency
effects of a particular merger outweigh the market power effects and
therefore provide a net benefit to society. The author concurs with
other commentators that in most marginally illegal mergers 14 increased
efficiencies are likely to outweigh any increase in market power. The
author concludes, however, that the efficiency defense is impracticable
because both the efficiency and market power effects of a merger are
virtually impossible to quantify in any particular case. In fact, courts
measure market power by only the crudest of proxies: usually the de-
fendant's share of some relevant market.15 Likewise, a court often can-
not even identify the particular aspects of the merger that will yield
efficiency gains, much less quantify those gains. Both market power
and efficiency are, in the words of Judge Posner, "intractable subjects
for litigation."'16
Because the market power and efficiency effects of mergers are
generally uncertain and rarely, if ever, measurable by the courts, this
Article proposes an alternative method of determining whether a court
should hear a private action seeking damages for an illegal merger.
First, if the complaint on its face alleges injury resulting from the post-
merger firm's increased efficiency, the case should be dismissed. Such a
result is dictated by the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 4 of
the Clayton Act in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc..17 That inter-
pretation requires a plaintiff to show that its injury resulted from that
which makes the challenged conduct illegal. 18 Under section 7, the
market power effects of a merger make it illegal, not its efficiency
effects.
Second, if the complaint alleges injury resulting from a monopoly
14. For the purposes of this Article, a marginally illegal merger is a merger that is
clearly, but slightly over the threshold for legality described in the 1984 Merger Guidelines.
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
1984 Merger Guidelines]. However, such a merger clearly does not produce a monopolist
and may not result in actual collusion, only in the increased likelihood of collusion.
15. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at §§ 3.1, 3.2.
16. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976).
17. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
18. See infra notes 80-81 & accompanying text.
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overcharge, the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed. Monopoly over-
charge injuries are inherently inefficient, and allowing such a claim cre-
ates little risk of deterring socially beneficial mergers.
Finally, if the plaintiff alleges some secondary anticompetitive
practice, such as an exclusionary practice, the plaintiff should be re-
quired to proceed under the antitrust laws dealing with the challenged
practice. The tests developed under other provisions of the antitrust
laws are specifically designed to ensure that socially beneficial activity
is not condemned. Allowing plaintiffs to proceed under section 7 as
well creates the risk that a court will condemn the challenged practice
merely because of a recent merger, without considering the overall so-
cial impact of the practice. The Supreme Court's decision in Brunswick
can be read to require such a limitation on private actions.
The Economic Costs of Mergers to Non-Merging Parties
When analyzing antitrust merger policy, it is essential to distin-
guish between the effects of a merger on society at large and its effects
on individual private parties. All mergers-horizontal, vertical, and
conglomerate 19-may increase or facilitate the exercise of market
power by the post-merger firm20 as well as create substantial efficien-
cies.21 A merger is socialy beneficial if the social gains that result from
increased efficiency outweigh the social losses that result from in-
creased market power. However, both increased market power and ef-
ficiency gains created by mergers can produce private injuries,
regardless of whether society as a whole has been harmed. For exam-
19. This Article uses the terms "horizontal," "vertical," and "conglomerate" in the
traditional way, not the way in which they are used in the 1984 Merger Guidelines. A
merger is horizontal if it involves two firms that manufacture the same product and sell it in
the same geographic area. A vertical merger involves two firms that stand in a supplier-
buyer relationship. A conglomerate merger is a merger that is neither horizontal or vertical.
The 1984 Merger Guidelines abandon the distinction between vertical and conglomerate
mergers and classify all mergers as either "horizontal" or "non-horizontal." 1984 Merger
Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,834. For criticism of this classification system, which
originated in the 1982 Merger Guidelines, see Williamson, Vertical Merger Guidelines: In-
terpreting the 1982 Reforms, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 604, 605-06 (1983).
20. A merger that does not increase the post-merger firm's market power may never-
theless facilitate the exercise of market power if the merger encourages price fixing or other
forms of collusion in the post-merger market. Such collusion requires that the colluding
firms collectively have substantial market power. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 95 HARV. L. Rav. 937, 937-38 (1981).
21. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at § 11.2. "Efficiency" is used here in the poten-
tial Pareto sense: an action is potential Pareto efficient if all those who gain from the change
gain enough to compensate fully all those who lose from the change, even though they do
not compensate them in fact. See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 8-12.
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ple, increased market power resulting from a horizontal merger may
lead to higher purchase prices resulting in higher costs for customers of
the post-merger firm.22 The firm's competitors, on the other hand,
would generally be better off; they could either sell at a higher price
themselves, or increase their own output to serve the post-merger firm's
former customers who are unwilling to pay the post-merger firm's in-
creased price.
In contrast, competitors of the post-merger firm are generally in-
jured by increased efficiency resulting from the merger. When one firm
in a market becomes more efficient it can lower its prices, making its
products more attractive to customers than the products of the other
firms in the same market. Competitors could lose market share or, at
the extreme, be forced out of the market altogether.
Analysis of the market power and efficiency effects of vertical
mergers is less complex, because vertical mergers do not often increase
a firm's market power, unless the market power is itself a product of the
firm's increased efficiency.23 On the other hand, vertical mergers can
undoubtedly improve efficiency.24 The same conclusion generally ap-
plies to conglomerate mergers.25
Although both increased market power and increased efficiency
can impose private costs on those who are not parties to the merger,
generally only the exercise of market power imposes social costs. Effi-
ciency created by a merger generally increases social welfare. 26 Fur-
22. To a lesser extent, the customers of a firm's competitors could also be injured.
When a firm exercises market power by raising prices, it creates a price "umbrella" under
which its competitors can also raise their prices to a supracompetitive level. Purchasers from
competitors would therefore also be injured by increased market power. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that they would have a cause of action under the federal antitrust laws. See Mid-West
Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 584-86 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Coor-
dinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335, 1339 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 972 (1984).
23. See4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1000, at 207 (1980); R. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 225-45 (1978); Easterbrook,
Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984); Posner, The
Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 6 (1981). However, there are commentators who believe that vertical integration can
enhance market power under appropriate conditions. See, e.g., Williamson, Assessing Verti-
cal Market Restrictions. Antitrust Ram4fcations ofthe Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 953 (1979).
24. See R. BORK, supra note 23, at 226; Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense
Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 724 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Williamson, Antitrust
Revisitea; Williamson, supra note 19.
25. See Williamson, Antitrust Revisited, supra note 24, at 724.
26. See supra note 3. For a more detailed analysis of the social costs and benefits of
mergers, see Posner, Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975);
[Vol. 35
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thermore, many cases decided in the 1970's and 1980's emphasize that a
primary goal of federal antitrust policy is to encourage efficient prac-
tices and to condemn certain inefficient ones.27 Difficulty arises, how-
ever, because many mergers simultaneously increase the merging firms'
market power andproduce efficiencies. 28 The overall social welfare ef-
fects of such mergers can be uncertain.
Because the role of the DOJ and the FTC is to prevent or to re-
dress public injuries, their merger challenges presumably are based on
the conclusion that the merger is socially harmful because its efficiency
effects are outweighed by the potential for increased market power.
Private plaintiffs, however, sue to redress private injuries. Such injuries
may be caused either by the increased market power or by the increased
efficiency of the post-merger firm. If the cause of the injury is increased
market power, it is likely that society as a whole has also been injured,
and a law suit would be consistent with the principle that only socially
harmful mergers should be condemned. If the cause of the injury is the
increased efficiency of the post-merger firm, however, a lawsuit would
tend to deter mergers that are socially beneficial. To avoid overdeter-
rence, courts should decline to hear private plaintiffs who have been
harmed not by increased market power but by increased efficiency.
Determining the Cause of the Private Plaintiff's Injury
A court could well presume that a marginally illegal merger in the
United States today does not produce private injuries from increased
market power. First, the test that has been used by the Supreme Court
to scrutinize mergers under section 7 is likely to condemn a merger
long before the post-merger firm has attained a market share approach-
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AMER. ECON.
REV. 18 (1968). For discussion of the divergence between private and social costs in private
antitrust damages claims, see Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Ap-
proach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467 (1980); Note, Rethinking Antitrust Dam-
ages, 33 STAN. L. REV. 329 (1981).
27. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d
263, 291 n.50 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See generally Sullivan, The
Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1982) (arguing that the Burger Court has focused on economic
efficiency to the exclusion of other considerations that should be relevant).
28. See Williamson, Antitrust Revisited, supra note 24, at 723-33. See generally Fisher
& Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1587-96
(1983). For a general discussion of the kinds of economies that can be attained by horizon-
tal and vertical integration, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 81-150 (2d ed. 1980).
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ing monopoly proportions. 29 A marginally illegal horizontal merger is
not likely to have any immediately perceptible effect on the ability of
the post-merger firm to reduce output and raise prices. Second,
although courts today are much more cautious about condemning
mergers than they were fifteen or twenty years ago,30 the DOJ's 1984
Merger Guidelines31 establish a threshold of illegality that is unlikely
to allow post-merger firms significant market power;32 in a marginal
29. See supra notes 6-9 & accompanying text.
30. Eg., United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
31. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984).
32. The 1984 Merger Guidelines employ the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a
measure of market concentration. The HHI is designed to reflect the fact that market power
does not vary directly with market share but increases much faster than market share in-
creases as the market becomes more concentrated. The HHI equals the sum of the squares
of the market shares of the firms in the market.
Under the 1984 Merger Guidelines, the DOJ is likely to challenge a horizontal merger
in which the post-merger market concentration is above 1800 as measured by the HHI and
when the merger itself increases the HHI in the market by 100 points. See 1984 Merger
Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,831. A market with one firm having a 100% market share
would have an HHI of 10,000. An atomized market comprised of thousands of competitors
would have an HHI approaching zero. A highly concentrated market, with three corpora-
tions having market shares of 40%, 35%, and 25% would have an HHI of 3450. (402 + 352 +
252 = 3450.) For further analysis, see H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at § 11.4; Areeda,
Justice's Merger Guidelines: The General Theory, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 303 (1983); Calkins, The
New Merger Guidelines and the Herfndahl-Hirschman Index, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 402 (1983).
See also Fox, he New Merger Guidelines-4 Blueprintfor Microeconomic 4nalysis, 27 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 519 (1982); Miller, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a Market Structure
Variable: An Exposition for Antitrust Practitioners, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 593 (1982).









G to Z (fringe firms) less than 1% each
The level of concentration according to the HHI in the pre-merger market is approxi-
mately 1930. A merger between Company B and Company F would produce a post-merger
HHI of about 2130. Such a merger would clearly be subject to challenge under the 1984
Merger Guidelines. Yet most likely the new company B-F will not have substantially more
market power than Company B had before the merger. See infra notes 68-70 & accompany-
ing text. Company B-F still is only the second largest firm in the market and still has only a
25% market share, clearly not enough to support a case for monopolization under § 2 of the
Sherman Act. See Dimitt Agri Indus. Inc. v. CPC Int'l Inc., 679 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1770 (1983). If a private party were to file a damages action, alleging
that the merger of companies B and F violated § 7, the plaintiff would almost certainly be
unable to show either the fact or amount of any monopoly overcharge. The chief rationale
offered by the DOJ for condemning such a horizontal merger is that the merger would make
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case a private plaintiff almost certainly could not show either the fact or
amount of any monopoly overcharge. 33 Third, mergers are absolutely
public acts. Unlike price fixing or predatory pricing, a merger today
generally cannot be accomplished by secret agreement. Even the
smallest mergers are generally a matter of public record, and most sig-
nificant mergers are announced to the government before they take
place.34 Consequently, mergers do not present the kinds of "detection"
problems that attend price fixing, monopolization, and various forms of
attempts to monopolize. Moreover, at least one of the merging parties
has generally made a reasonable calculation that the merger is legal.35
A merger that would give the post-merger firm the immediate ability to
raise prices to monopoly levels is improbable unless someone has made
a major miscalculation, in which case either the DOJ or the FTC is
likely to respond swiftly.
Other evidence suggests that mergers rarely result in private inju-
ries from increased market power. Most private merger suits are filed
by competitors or potential competitors of the merging parties, rather
than by consumers. Mergers that increase market power and therefore
injure society are likely to benefit competitors. After the merger, com-
petitors will be able to increase price along with the post-merger firm or
to increase output to satisfy those customers unwilling to pay the post-
merger firm's higher prices. On the other hand, competitors are likely
to be injured when the merger increases efficiency and therefore bene-
fits society. The post-merger firm will be able to lower prices and in-
crease market share at the expense of competitors who cannot match
the efficiencies. In most actions brought by competitors of the post-
merger firm, the presumption should be that the plaintiff was injured
primarily by the post-merger firm's increased efficiency, not by its in-
creased market power.
tacit or express collusion much more likely than it was before the merger. The mere likeli-
hood of price fixing, however, will not support an action for damages. The private plaintiff
seeking damages on such a theory would have to prove actual collusion. In that case the fact
that the price fixing was facilitated by an earlier merger would be irrelevant. See infra note
91 & accompanying text.
33. See supra note 32 & accompanying text.
34. See Clayton Act, § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982) (requiring pre-merger notification
with respect to large mergers). See generally Symposium, The Effects of Hart-Scott-Rodino
Premerger Notiflcation Requirements on Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers, 48 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 1451 (1979).
35. Both parties do not always agree as to the legality of the merger. Often the target of
a hostile tender offer, for example, will oppose the merger on antitrust grounds. See, e.g.,
Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil
Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). See generally Easter-
brook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits By Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155 (1982).
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The Failure of the Efficiency Defense
In theory, one way to avoid overdeterrence caused by a private
litigant suing for injuries caused by the post-merger firm's increased
efficiency is to provide the defendant with an "efficiency defense." 36
Under such a defense, the plaintiff would fail if the defendant proves
that the socially beneficial efficiency created by the merger outweighs
any harmful market power effects that the merger might also have.
Unfortunately, this approach is fraught with problems.
First, it is important to consider the role that the concept of effi-
ciency plays in antitrust policy. As a matter of history, the Supreme
Court has not only condemned efficiency-creating mergers, but has
sometimes condemned them precisely because they were efficiency-cre-
ating.3 7 In fact, the Supreme Court has condemned mergers whose ef-
fect on the market power of the merging firms was so small that it could
not be measured and whose only measurable effects were the merging
firms' increased efficiency.38 That position is probably no longer the
law,39 and today's antitrust ideology places a high value on efficiency.40
Even today, however, no general "efficiency defense" is recognized
in merger cases.41 Many mergers that create efficiencies are still illegal
36. See generally Fisher & Lande, supra note 28; Rogers, The Limited Casefor an Effi-
ciency Defense in Horizontal Mergers, 58 TULANE L. REV. 503 (1983).
37. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 394 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
38. For example, see Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344:
The retail outlets of integrated companies [such as the defendant], by eliminating
wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the manufacturing
division of the enterprise, can market their own brands at prices below those of
competing independent retailers. Of course, some of the results of large integrated
or chain operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered
unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely affected.
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to
recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of via-
ble, small locally owned business. Congress appreciated that occasional higher
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.
We must give effect to that decision.
39. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-98 (1974) (approv-
ing consideration of factors indicating that a particular merger, in fact, would not impair
competition significantly even though it occurred in a moderately concentrated industry).
40. See supra note 27.
41. See Edwards, Joffe, Kolasky, McGowan, Mendez-Penate, Ordover, Proger, Solo-
mon & Toepke, Proposed Revisions of the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1560-64 (1981); Fisher & Lande, supra note 28; Muris, The Efficiency
Defense Under Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 30 CAsE W. RES. 381, 382-83 (1980); Rogers,
supra note 36; see also Markovits, Predicting the Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers in
a Monopolisticaly Competitive World .4 Non-Market-Oriented Proposal and Critique ofthe
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
MERGER ACTIONS
under section 7, even though the efficiencies may outweigh the undesir-
able market power effects. Indeed, antitrust scholars from the Chicago
School,42 and the 1984 Merger Guidelines, 43 agree that claims of spe-
cific efficiencies should not ordinarily be accepted as mitigating factors
for mergers that would otherwise be challenged. The DOJ reasons as
follows: 44 As a general rule, firms merge because the merger will either
give them market power or enable them to reduce their costs. 45 If the
merger produces no immediate market power, then the profitability of
the merger must lie in its capacity to achieve certain efficiencies. Such
mergers should not be condemned. However, if the merger does create
a substantial threat of increased market power or collusion, then the
welfare consequences of the merger can be evaluated only by balancing
the social gains created by the efficiencies against any loss caused by
monopoly pricing. That balancing is simply not possible except in
cases where the efficiencies created by the merger are both very sub-
stantial and very obvious. For that reason the DOJ will consider post-
merger efficiencies as a mitigating factor only when the merging firms
produce "clear and convincing evidence" of substantial efficiencies that
could not have been achieved by some other means less threatening to
competition than the merger.46 The efficiency statement in the 1984
Merger Guidelines-which is not really a "defense" at all, but only an
indication of how the DOJ will exercise its enforcement discretion-is
the closest thing to an "efficiency defense" in current merger enforce-
ment standards.47
Market Definition-Market Share-Market Concentration Approach, 56 TEx. L. REV. 587, 729-
30 (1978).
42. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 4.
43. The 1984 Merger Guidelines are a product of the new economic orientation in
antitrust law, if not an outright product of Chicago School economic theories. See Schwartz,
The New Merger Guidelines: Guide to Governmental Discretion and Private Counseling or
Propaganda for Revision of the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CALIF. L. RE. 575, 577-78 (1983).
44. See Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and
Failure, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 497 (1983).
45. Of course, cost reduction itself produces market power. For example, the Landes &
Posner analysis, discussed infra at note 65 & accompanying text, measures market power by
the ratio of a firm's profit-maximizing price to its marginal costs. A firm whose marginal
costs go down as a result of a merger, a patented invention, or some other efficiency-creating
innovation may at least temporarily have a profit-maximizing price above its new marginal
cost. The relevant question in merger cases is not whether the post-merger firm's profit rate
is higher, but whether the post-merger firm has the power profitably to restrict output to
below the pre-merger level.
46. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,834.
47. Areeda and Turner would permit an efficiency defense when both pre-merger firms
in a horizontal merger suffer from substantial diseconomies because they are too small.
However, they note that firms suffering from such substantial diseconomies are probably not
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Even those who oppose the establishment of an "efficiency de-
fense," however, believe that mergers have a great propensity to create
efficiency, and that only a relatively small number of mergers ought to
be found illegal under the antitrust laws. Indeed, if mergers contained
no potential for social benefit, there would be a per se rule against
them. In that case, any potential for harm, no matter how trivial,
would justify prohibition.48
Approaches to Balancing Efficiency and Market Price Effects:
Specific Applications and General Conclusions
Although the concept of an efficiency defense has not gained much
acceptance, two approaches suggest themselves as a means of prevent-
ing overdeterrence of socially beneficial mergers, and merit discussion.
These approaches demonstrate that most mergers probably do create
substantial efficiencies. However, analysis suggests that these ap-
proaches cannot be applied in individual cases to resolve the question
of whether a particular merger should be condemned.
Professor Oliver Williamson has suggested that courts balance the
market power effects of a merger against its efficiency effects. 49 Stand-
ing alone, this suggestion sounds much like the efficiency defense de-
scribed above. However, Professor Williamson suggested that mergers
produce much more substantial efficiencies than was formerly be-
lieved.50 Further, he suggested that very small increases in efficiency
will offset relatively large increases in market power.51
Professor Williamson first pointed out that mergers may have a
greater capacity to create efficiency than antitrust lawyers and econo-
mists previously had realized. Most of this efficiency is the result of
competitive to begin with; thus the "failing company" defense would be a more appropriate
defense. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 158-60 (1980).
48.. If a practice is thought to have only harmful consequences and no beneficial ones,
then per se treatment is appropriate. See, e.g., National Soe'y of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). A per se rule is inappropriate for mergers because a
court cannot make a decision about a merger's legality until it balances the relatively ambig-
uous potential of the merger to increase the defendant's market power against its equally
ambiguous potential to create efficiencies of production and/or distribution. See H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at § 4.4.
49. See Williamson, Antitrust Revisited, supra note 24, at 723. The arguments appeared
earlier in Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Weifare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REv. 18 (1968) and Williamson, The Economies of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Con-
siderations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (1974).
50. Williamson, Antitrust Revisited, supra note 24, at 724.
51. Id. at 723.
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transactional, rather than productive, economies.5 2
Antitrust lawyers used to look primarily at productive efficiencies,
concluding that the efficiencies created by many mergers are relatively
small.53 As a general rule, productive economies, or economies of
scale, are achieved because a larger plant or operation can function at a
lower cost per unit of output than a smaller one. Often, however,
mergers do not result in larger plants, but in more plants of the same
size coming under the control of a single management.5 4
Williamson argued that the real efficiency gains from mergers re-
sult from transactional economies.5 5 Transactional economies are
economies achieved because an integrated firm needs to enter the mar-
ketplace fewer times than does a nonintegrated firm. For example, a
grocer who sells potatoes must find a source of supply, negotiate a
price, and bear the risk that the supplier will not perform. A grocery
chain that grows its own potatoes can avoid many of these costs.
Although transactional economies are most obviously achieved by
vertical mergers, horizontal mergers can facilitate them as well.56 Wil-
liamson concluded that mergers for "conventional scale-economy rea-
sons" are "much less common than mergers for transactional-economy
reasons."
5 7
Professor Williamson's more controversial conclusion was that a
merger that produces "nontrivial" economies-as little as 2%--gener-
ally yields a "net allocative-efficiency gain" to society 8 That is, a rela-
tively small efficiency gain resulting from a merger would more than
offset a relatively large gain in the merging firms' market power.5 9
52. Id
53. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 28, at 127-41.
54. Multi-plant economies can be substantial in certain industries, particularly if re-
search and development costs are high, or if multi-plant operation facilitates promotion or
distribution. See F. SCHERER, supra note 28, at 100-04; G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 298-305 (1983).
55. Williamson, Antitrust Revisited supra note 24, at 723.
56. For example, a large grocery chain can operate its own dairy or other sources of
supply and thus avoid reliance on the market place. See United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270, 288 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
57. Williamson, Antitrust Revisited, supra note 24, at 723. For general support of Wil-
liamson's position, see Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972). See also the path-breaking article by Ronald
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
58. Williamson, Antitrust Revisited, supra note 24, at 708-09.
59. Figure 1 illustrates Williamson's argument. Assume that before the merger a firm
had costs equal to line ACI on the graph, but after the merger those costs were reduced to
AC 2. At the same time, however, the merger gave the post-merger firm enough market
power to reduce its output from Q, to Q2- Shaded rectangle A2 represents the efficiency
gains produced by this merger, while shaded triangle A, represents the deadweight loss pro-
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Indeed, Williamson produced a table suggesting that relatively
small gains in post-merger efficiency could offset relatively large price
increases stemming from the post-merger firm's increased market
power.60
Professor Williamson's theory is subject to some criticism. For ex-
ample, although it considers the deadweight loss caused by monopoly
pricing-that is, pricing in excess of marginal cost by a seller with mar-
ket power-Williamson's calculations ignore the loss caused by mo-
nopoly conduct. Monopoly conduct is that conduct undertaken by a
duced by the increased market power of the post-merger firm. If the area of A2 is greater
than A,, then the merger is efficient: that is, it produces a net social gain, even though it












Furthermore, in many instances A2 is larger than A,. The efficiency gains are distrib-
uted over every unit of production that the post-merger firm sells. On the other hand, the
deadweight loss caused by the reduction in output applies only to the amount of output
restricted. Thus, for example, if the post-merger firm was able to reduce output by 10% from
the pre-merger level, the deadweight loss would be measured only over the loss suffered by
those 10% of sales that are not made, and the inefficient substitutions caused thereby. On the
other hand, the cost saving due to the increased efficiency will apply to the entire 90% of
production remaining. See Muris, supra note 41, at 386.
60. Williamson, Antitrust Revisited, supra note 24, at 709.
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firm in order to create or to preserve market power.61 If monopoly
profits are, for example, $1,000,000 per year, a profit-maximizing firm
will be willing to spend virtually any amount up to $1,000,000, dis-
counted by the probability of acquiring or maintaining the power, in
order to acquire or keep such monopoly profits. To be sure, this money
may be spent in socially beneficial ways. Research and development,
for example, can yield market power to the person who comes up with
a new process or invention. On the other hand, much of this money
could be spent in socially detrimental ways, such as predatory pricing,
false advertising, or sabotage. Economic loss to society may be caused
by inefficient spending designed for no other purpose than the preser-
vation or acquisition of monopoly power.
Another criticism of Williamson's analysis is that it permits a post-
merger firm an efficiency defense even when the post-merger firm actu-
ally reduces output below the pre-merger level and charges higher
prices. The firm would simply have to show that the efficiencies cre-
ated by the merger outweigh the deadweight loss resulting from the
monopoly pricing. It would make no difference that the benefit of
these efficiencies accrued to the post-merger firm in the form of higher
profits rather than to the consumers in the form of higher output and
lower prices. Such an efficiency defense is inconsistent with Congress'
intent and would probably be politically unacceptable.62
Professor Landes and Judge Posner have proposed an analysis that
would suggest a different approach to the problem of measuring the
economic effects of mergers. They have attempted to quantify the rela-
tionship between market power on the one hand and market share,
market elasticity of demand, and the supply elasticity of fringe compet-
itors on the other.63 Were the necessary data available, their analysis
could be used to quantify and compare any social cost incurred as a
result of increased market power from a merger with the benefits re-
sulting from efficiency gains. 64
The Landes-Posner formula can be used to calculate a firm's profit
maximizing price as follows:
61. See R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 10-13; Posner, The Social Cost of Monopoly and
Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
62. This, to be sure, is a distributive concern. See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Origi-
nal and Primary Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 65, 142-45 (1982).
63. Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937 (1981).
64. For similar analysis, see Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust:
The Realemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 994 (1979).
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Pi = -Ci/(Si/ (E d + E .(1 - Si))-l),65 where:
Pi = profit-maximizing price;
C = marginal cost at price Pj;
Si = market share;
E d market elasticity of demand;66 and
E* = the elasticity of supply of competing fringe firms.67
Assume a merger68 in a market in which Company A has a 30%
market share, Companies B and C have 20% each, Companies D and E
have 10% each, Company F has 5%, and several small firms share the
remaining 5%. Assume that the elasticity of demand in the market is
1-that is, that a 1% increase in the market price will yield a 1% reduc-
tion in demand. Finally, assume that the elasticity of supply of com-
peting firms is 1.5-that is, that a 1% rise in price by one firm will yield
a 1.5% increase in output by competitors. 69
65. The formula used by Professor Landes and Judge Posner is as follows: (Pi-Ci)/
Pi=Si/( E d-+ Ejl(1-Si)). Landes & Posner, supra note 63, at 945. The formula in the text is
restated to solve for Pi.
Landes and Posner also identify an alternative formula for directly measuring market
power increases in mergers. Id. at 972-73. However, the formula set forth in the text is
better for quantifying the effects of efficiency changes on the post-merger firm's profit-maxi-
mizing price.
66. Market elasticity of demand is the elasticity of demand faced collectively by all the
firms in a market. If the market elasticity of demand is 2, a 10% price increase will result in
a 20% decrease in market demand. If it is 3, a 10% price increase will yield a 30% decrease in
demand.
67. Elasticity of supply considers the output of competing and fringe firms when the
price in a market rises. If competitors raise output by 20% in response to a firm's 10% price
increase, the elasticity of supply facing the price-raising firm is 2. If competitors raise output
by 30% in response to a 10% price increase, elasticity of supply is 3.
68. See supra note 32.
69. The calculations given here assume that market elasticities remain constant before
and after the merger. A merger may change market elasticities. See Ordover, Sykes & Wil-
lig, Herfindahl Concentration, Rivalry, and Mergers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1857, 1867 (1982).
However, there is no reason to think that a merger of the sort described here will change
elasticities substantially, since the post-merger firm's profit-maximizing price differs from
the profit-maximizing price of the pre-merger firms by only 3%.
In general, elasticity of demand rises as the market becomes more concentrated and
price rises. Efficiencies, however, will mitigate this tendency.
The situation with respect to elasticity of supply is more complex. In general, if the
post-merger firm's profit-maximizing price is higher than the profit-maximizing prices of the
pre-merger firms, the effect will be to encourage other firms to increase output and supply
elasticities will rise. However, if a firm's merger partner was the firm most likely to increase
output in response to a price rise, then the elasticity of supply will be reduced. An extreme
example would be a market with very high entry barriers and two existing firms each capa-
ble of expanding output without limit. If the two firms were behaving competitively, each of
them would face a high elasticity of supply: as soon as one raised its price the other would
increase output. A merger between the two companies would reduce elasticity of supply
significantly.
In general, the rationale for a legal rule against "conglomerate," or potential competi-
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In this market Company B, with a 20% market share, has a small
amount of market power. If its marginal cost at its profit-maximizing
output is $1.00, its profit-maximizing price will be $1.10.
If Company B merges with Company F, the new company B-F
will have a 25% market share. In that case, if Company B-F's marginal
cost at the profit-maximizing output is $1.00, its profit-maximizing
price will be $1.13.
However, if B-F's marginal cost drops to 97 cents because of in-
creased efficiencies produced by the merger, then B-F's post-merger
profit-maximizing price will be $1.10, the same as Company B's pre-
merger profit-maximizing price.
In sum, in this particular merger, a 3% gain in efficiency would
roughly offset the increase in market power created by the merger.
Post-merger output would be about the same as it was before the
merger, and the post-merger company's profits would be roughly 3%
greater per unit of output than before the merger. The merger would
produce a net efficiency gain, but, at least initially, most of the benefits
of that gain would accrue to the post-merger firm.70
This hypothetical merger is challengeable under the 1984 Merger
Guidelines,7' but the application of the Landes-Posner analysis sug-
gests that a relatively small efficiency increase will compensate for the
increase in market power.72 The effect of the efficiency gain in such a
tion, mergers is that the merger increases market power by reducing the elasticity of supply
in the relevant market. See infra notes 121-24 & accompanying text.
70. Over the long term, however, the post-merger firm's high rate of return will attract
new capital, and competition, into the industry. Then the benefit of the efficiencies will
accrue to consumers.
If there were only a 1% efficiency gain, the post-merger firm's profit-maximizing price
would be $1.12. Output would be reduced slightly, purchasing consumers would be out of
pocket about 2 cents per unit, and the post-merger firm's initial profits would be about 3
cents higher per unit of output. On the other hand, if there were a 5% efficiency gain, the
post-merger profit-maximizing price would be $1.08. In that instance there would be a
rather large net gain, which initially would be shared by both consumers and the post-
merger firm.
If market demand elasticities were higher, the effect of efficiencies is even more dra-
matic. At a market elasticity of demand of 4 and a market elasticity of supply of 1.5, for
example, Company B with a 20% market share would have a profit-maximizing price of
SI.04. After the merger, company B-F would have a profit-maximizing price of $1.05. In
this instance, however, a 2% efficiency gain accruing from the merger would yield a post-
merger profit-maximizing price of $1.03.
71. The hypothetical is the same as that used supra note 32, illustrating the application
of the 1984 Merger Guidelines.
72. For example, in the hypothetical discussed a 3% gain in efficiency will roughly
offset the increase in market power created by the merger.
However, it is a little more difficult, using this approach, to justify Judge Bork's argu-
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marginal merger may very well be to restore output to its pre-merger
level while increasing the profitability of the post-merger firm. This
profitability would most likely encourage new firms to enter the market
or other firms already in the market to seek out the efficiencies, perhaps
through merger as well. The market would then tend toward a new
equilibrium in which the benefits of the increased efficiency will be
translated entirely into consumers' surplus.
Unfortunately, it does not follow that courts should attempt to bal-
ance efficiency effects against market-power effects in merger cases.
Although the Landes-Posner analysis might be used to calculate the
change in market power created by a hypothetical merger in a hypo-
thetical market, the difficulty of quantifying the variables in the
formula for application in the real world are generally insurmountable.
First, in order to determine the effect of the merger on the post-merger
firm's market power, we would need to know the merging companies'
market share, which in turn requires us to define a relevant market.73
Perhaps as many judicial resources have been employed in this piece of
guesswork as in any aspect of merger litigation.
The formula also requires a computation of the market's elasticity
of demand74 and the elasticity of supply of competing firms. These
data are notoriously difficult evidence to acquire for any market. Tech-
nical economists laboring under the best of academic conditions have
disputed elasticities over a wide range.75 Almost any attempt in litiga-
ment that horizontal mergers should not be challenged until the post-merger companies
achieve market shares in excess of 60% or so. See R. BORK, supra note 23, at 221. A firm
with a market share of 30% and a marginal cost at its profit-maximizing output of $1.00, in a
market with an elasticity of demand of I and an elasticity of supply of competing and fringe
firms of 1.5, would have a profit-maximizing price of $1.17. If the firm merged with another
identical firm with no change in efficiency, the profit-maximizing price of the new firm,
which has a 60% market share, would be about $1.60. In order for such a merger to generate
a post-merger profit-maximizing price equal to or less than the profit-maximizing prices of
the two individual firms before the merger, the efficiency created by the merger would have
to equal roughly 27%.
73. Landes and Posner suggest that precise definition of a relevant market is not criti-
cal, as long as the elasticities are computed properly for the market defined. If the market is
broadly defined, the market elasticities of demand will be low. If the market is narrowly
defined, elasticity of demand will be high. In general, computation of demand and supply
elasticity will correct an excessively broad or excessively narrow market definition. Landes
& Posner, supra note 63, at 947-48.
74. Both Williamson's calculations and Landes' and Posner's formula require knowl-
edge of the elasticity of demand facing the market if market share is known, or the elasticity
facing the firm if market share is not known.
75. Landes and Posner have commented on measuring elasticities of demand in real
markets, when the issue was not efficiency, but computation of the percentage of a monopoly
overcharge that is passed on to an indirect purchaser. See Landes & Posner, ShouldIndirect
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tion to determine the effect of a particular merger on the post-merger
firm's profit-maximizing price would involve a great deal of
speculation.
Measurement of the effects of a merger on the post-merger firm's
efficiency is nearly as difficult. Relevant efficiency gains are generally
measured by the decrease in marginal cost for a given level of output.
For example, in both the Williamson analysis and the Landes and Pos-
ner analysis discussed above, a firm producing X units per day at a
marginal cost of 90 cents is 10% more efficient than a firm producing X
units per day at a marginal cost of $1.00. Unfortunately, marginal cost
is not much easier to compute in litigation than the relevant elasticities
of supply and demand are. Two decades of experience in predatory
pricing cases have taught us that courts are not good estimators of such
factors.76
On the one hand, our knowledge that relatively small efficiencies
will often compensate for relatively substantial gains in market power
is secure. This tells us that many mergers make society better off. On
the other hand, precise balancing of efficiency gains and losses in a
particular merger case is virtually impossible, particularly in
litigation.77
Unless these elusive data are available, it is unrealistic to think
that courts can balance the increase in the defendants' market power as
Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the 4ntitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the
Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 619-20 (1979).
For other discussions of the problem of empirical determinations of elasticities, see W.
BAUMOL, The Empirical Determination of Demand Relations, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS (1965); Schmalensee, supra note 64, at 1007; Working, What Do Sta-
tistical Demand Curves Show 41 Q. J. EcON. 212 (1927).
For a slightly more confident assessment ofjudicial ability to ascertain market elastici-
ties in litigation, see Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge.- A Comprehen-
sive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269 (1979); Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in 4ntitrust
Treble Damage 4ctions: An Economic and Legal Anaysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883
(1975). For a critique of these assessments, see Landes & Posner, The Economics of Passing-
On: 4 Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1274 (1980).
For rough estimates of price elasticities in American markets of some everyday prod-
ucts, see H. HOUTHAKKER & L. TAYLOR, CONSUMER DEMAND IN THE UNITED STATES
1929-70 (1966); E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONoMICS: THEORY & APPLICATIONS 133-34
(1982); Hirsch, 4 Survey of Price Elasticities, 19 REV. ECON. STUDIES 50 (1951). See generally
G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 32-33, 38 (3d ed. 1966); Bishop, Elasticities, Cross-Elas-
ticities, and Market Relationships, 42 AM. ECON. REV. 779 (1952).
76. For a description of some of the difficulties in measuring marginal costs, see 3 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 715c, at 172-74 (1978). For the problems faced
by some recent courts, see generally Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, Predatory Pricing and
the Ninth Circuit, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 443.
77. R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 112.
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a result of a merger against any efficiencies. Congress was well advised
to use the words "may lessen competition" in section 7; it knew that
courts would be involved in a good deal of speculation.
Private Merger Enforcement: Efficiency and Antitrust Injury
Because mergers can create both productive and transactional effi-
ciencies, and because these efficiencies often can be inferred even
though they cannot be measured, courts should be careful not to con-
demn mergers that create efficiencies that will benefit consumers. Ac-
tions brought by the DOJ or the FTC are presumably based on
considerations of the social costs and benefits of mergers. We do not
have that confidence about private actions. Private plaintiffs sue in or-
der to redress private injuries, and private injuries are as likely to be
caused by the efficiency effects of mergers as by their market-power
effects.78 Even an efficient merger that results in enlarged output and
lower prices injures some people, most generally the post-merger firm's
competitors or its independent dealers. Although a general efficiency
defense in merger cases is impracticable, private actions for damages
can be limited in several ways to avoid overdeterrence of socially bene-
ficial mergers.
First, courts should focus on the manner in which the plaintiff was
harmed by the merger. In most private merger actions seeking dam-
ages, a court can determine rather clearly, often by merely looking at
the complaint, whether the plaintiff is complaining about the post-
merger firm's increased market power or its increased efficiency. If the
plaintiff is alleging harm based on the efficiency created by the merger,
the court should dismiss the complaint. Such a result is implicitly re-
quired by the Supreme Court's antitrust injury doctrine, as defined in
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mfat, Inc.79
In Brunswick the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not
recover damages for a section 7 violation when the alleged injury re-
sulted from the mere continuation of its competitor in the market after
the competitor was acquired by the defendant.80 Justice Marshall
wrote for the Court that a plaintiff in such a merger case must prove
"antitrust injury," that is, injury flowing from "that which makes de-
78. See supra text accompanying notes 19-26.
79. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
80. The plaintiff alleged that its competitor would have gone out of business but for the
competitor's acquisition by a much larger firm. If the competitor had gone out of business,
the plaintiff would have had a much larger market share. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 484.
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fendants' acts unlawful."8' What makes the defendant's conduct un-
lawful in a merger case is not the merger's tendency to increase
efficiency, but its tendency to increase the defendant's market power.
Second, if the plaintiff has a bona fide claim of antitrust injury that
results from the defendant's increased market power, then the court
should consider whether the plaintiffs injuries resulted from monopoly
pricing or from some other impermissible exercise of market power.
As a general rule monopoly pricing alone is not a violation of the
antitrust laws; a firm that has become a monopolist by lawful means
may charge its profit-maximizing price, even though that price may be
substantially above its costs. 82 Moreover, a monopolist may reduce
output to a level that will clear the market at the profit-maximizing
price.
Monopoly pricing becomes illegal under section 2 of the Sherman
Act, however, if it results from illegally created market power.83 His-
torically, mergers that create a monopoly have been violations of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.84 A private plaintiff who is the victim of a
monopoly overcharge resulting from an illegal merger ought to have a
cause of action for damages in the amount of the overcharge. 85 If sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act requires courts to allow a private damages
action for violation of the antitrust laws, and if the antitrust injury doc-
trine requires the plaintiff to show harm resulting from the defendant's
exercise of market power, this is certainly the type of case in which a
plaintiff should be allowed to proceed under section 7.
But what about the private plaintiff who alleges that it has been
injured in some other way by the increased market power of the post-
merger firm? Such injuries do occur, but there is already an array of
antitrust laws designed to deal with them. A plaintiff who claims to be
injured by an exclusionary practice facilitated by the post-merger firm's
increased market power has a cause of action under a statute designed
to measure such activities. This would perhaps be an action for mon-
opolization or predatory pricing under section 2 of the Sherman Act, or
perhaps for exclusive dealing, reciprocity or tying under section 3 of the
Clayton Act. The case law under these statutes is designed to distin-
81. Id. at 489.
82. See United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
83. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at § 5.6.
84. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Northern See. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
85. See infra notes 91-92.
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guish between the efficiency-creating and efficiency-destroying effects
of practices alleged to be exclusionary.
For example, private plaintiffs have occasionally complained that
a merger is illegal because it enabled the defendant to engage in preda-
tory pricing.86 The plausibility of such a claim aside, the plaintiff's
claim of damages must depend on proof that the defendant has actually
been charging a predatory price. Because mergers have the capacity to
create substantial efficiencies, a post-merger price reduction that ap-
pears predatory to a competitor may in fact reflect nothing more than
the post-merger firm's increased efficiency. How does one tell the dif-
ference between a predatory price reduction and a price reduction re-
sulting from efficiency? By asking what courts always ask in predatory
pricing cases brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act: namely,
whether the price was calculated to drive competitors out of the market
or to discipline them, so that the defendant could charge monopoly
prices later.87 Thus, the plaintiff will have to make out the elements of
a predatory pricing claim. If it does so, its damages will not be en-
larged because in the process it proves an illegal merger as well. What
some courts mistakenly have done is to reason that if the plaintiff is
complaining about an unlawful merger, then the existence of the
merger makes the claim of predatory pricing plausible regardless of
whether the post-merger pricing was really predatory. The result is
what amounts to two quite different predatory pricing tests: a rather
strict one for actions brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act, and a
rather liberal one, when there has been a recent merger, for actions
brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act.88
The unavoidable message of Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc.89 is that, in order to state a cause of action, a private plaintiff
must be injured by the post-merger firm's market power, not by its in-
creased efficiency. Unfortunately, post-Brunswick courts have often
failed to read the Brunswick opinion this way. Properly used in private
merger cases, Brunswick's antitrust injury doctrine can be a superb de-
vice for dealing with private merger actions at an early stage of the
proceedings. Even if a merger is presumed to be unlawful-as it would
86. See, e.g., Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979) (dis-
cussed infra notes 130-40 & accompanying text).
87. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
88. See the discussion of Purex Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., infra notes 130-40 &
accompanying text.
89. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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be, for example, under the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppe 90-a
plaintiff in a merger case should not prevail unless it shows that its own
injury was caused by the defendant's market power, not by its post-
merger efficiency.
The discussion that follows applies the considerations developed
above to three types of mergers: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate.
Horizontal Mergers
The law of horizontal mergers is designed to combat two evils.
One is that the merger may create a monopolist with the ability to
charge monopoly prices. The second is that the merger may facilitate
cartelization in the post-merger market, which now has one fewer firm
and perhaps a more dominant firm than it had before the merger.91
A private plaintiff complaining about price fixing would have an
action for price fixing, whether or not the merger was illegal. Assuming
the price fixing could be established, an additional cause of action
under section 7 would be superfluous. A purchaser complaining about
the creation by merger of a monopoly should also have an action for
any monopoly overcharge. Although a firm may legally be a monopo-
list and may legally charge its profit-maximizing price, courts have con-
sistently held that a monopoly resulting from such a merger is itself
illegal. A purchaser from such a post-merger monopolist should be al-
lowed to bring its action under section 7 of the Clayton Act for two
reasons. First, a merger that yields a price increase to monopoly levels
is very likely inefficient. Second, the purchaser who pays a monopoly
price has suffered the most classic kind of "antitrust injury."
Few cases brought under section 7, however, have alleged such
facts.92 Most private antitrust actions challenging horizontal mergers
90. A legal presumption that a merger is unlawful can arise in two ways. First, § 5(a) of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982), provides that an earlier judgment in favor of the
government shall be prima facie evidence of a violation in a subsequent private action. See
Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 690 (1961); Purex Corp. v. Procter
and Gamble Co., 453 F.2d 288, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1065 (1972).
Second, if the requirements are met, a determination that the defendant has violated the law
in any action, whether public or private, can be dispositive with respect to a different, subse-
quent plaintiff under the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel. See Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 493 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203,
1210-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See general,y 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4468-4469 (1981); Note, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act and
Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Antitrust Damage Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 541 (1976).
91. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at § 11.1.
92. Joseph Ciccone & Sons, Inc. v. Eastern Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 623 (E. D. Pa.
1982), may be of this variety, but it is difficult to tell from the opinion.
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have been brought by the targets of tender offer bids.93 Such plaintiffs
cannot be victims of antitrust injury as defined by Brunswick, because
the plaintiff will be the beneficiary, not the victim, of any market power
held by the post-merger firm. 94 After the merger, the target will share
with the tender offeror any profits generated by increased market
power. The target's motives in challenging the acquisition generally
have nothing to do with the antitrust consequences of the merger.
Cases have also arisen in which a distributor was terminated in the
wake of an allegedly illegal horizontal merger.95 Such a termination
could be part of a scheme, whether monopolization or collusion, that
results in reduced output by the post-merger firm. Since the post-
merger firm produces less after the merger than the two merger part-
ners did before, the post-merger firm requires fewer distributors. On
the other hand, the termination could have been caused by the post-
merger firm's increased efficiency; after the merger a single dealer or
distributor might be sufficient to handle the output of both firms.
If the dealer is terminated because of increased efficiency, there
should be no action for damages as a matter of policy. The dealer is
not a victim of antitrust injury. If the termination is part of a firm's
post-merger output reduction, the terminated dealer already has a
cause of action for monopolization or attempt to monopolize under sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.96 The question whether the horizontal
93. See, e.g., Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Marathon Oil
Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
94. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits By Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MIcH. L.
Rnv. 1155 (1982).
95. See John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1977). The
court held that the plaintiff was not in the "target area" of the violation and dismissed the
complaint for lack of standing. Id. at 499-500. The "target area" test is eminently ill-suited
for determining whether the plaintiffs injury under such circumstances was anticompetitive.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs case without deciding whether the distributor termina-
tions were the result of efficiency or reduction of output. If the latter, the plaintiff should
have had a cause of action under § 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff had originally in-
cluded a count under § 2 for monopolization and attempt to monopolize but later dismissed
it voluntarily. Id at 497 n.3. For similar use of the "target area" test, see Solinger v. A & M
Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1310-12 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979); Bosse
v. Crowell, Collier & Macmillan, 565 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1977). See also McDonald v.
Johnson & Johnson, 537 F. Supp. 1282, 1325-29 (D. Minn. 1982), nodffed, 722 F.2d 1370
(8th Cir. 1983).
96. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359
(1927); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
917 (1980); Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Dailey v. Qual-
ity School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967), aft'd after remand, 427 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.
1970) (involving allegations that an employee was terminated as the result of an illegal
merger); Mount Lebanon Motors v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F.Supp. 453 (W. D. Pa. 1968), aj?'d,
417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969). Contra Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th
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merger was illegal under section 7 has little to do with whether the
dealer terminations that followed were an exercise of market power or
the result of increased efficiency. The law of monopolization, not the
law of mergers, is a much more suitable mechanism for addressing that
question.
Vertical Mergers
Of all mergers, vertical acquisitions are the most likely to produce
efficiencies and the least likely to enhance the market power of the
merging firms. 97 Nevertheless, private antitrust actions challenging
vertical mergers have been brought under a number of theories.
Some plaintiffs have alleged simply that the new vertically inte-
grated firm was able to undersell the plaintiff and that the plaintiff lost
business as a result.98 Clearly, such complaints should be dismissed
under the Brunswick doctrine because the plaintiff is complaining that
the defendant is a better competitor, not a poorer one.
In other cases, plaintiffs have alleged that a competitor's illegal
vertical acquisition foreclosed the plaintiff from entering or competing
in a certain market.99 For example, if both plaintiff and defendant are
suppliers who service a certain chain of retail stores and the defendant
acquires the chain of stores, it is possible that the plaintiff will no
longer supply those stores. If so, the plaintiff could be injured by the
loss of business.
But is competition injured? In order to supply the retail store's
requirements, the merged supplier will either have to stop supplying
some other stores or increase its own output substantially. Unless the
merged supplier and retail store have very large shares of their respec-
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Solinger v. A & M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304
(9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979).
97. See generally, R. BORK, supra note 23, at 196-201; 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 1000a, at 207-08 (1980).
98. This appears to be the theory under which a vertical acquisition of a supplier was
challenged in Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. Dic Concrete Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1016, 1022-
23 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
99. See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 545 F. Supp. 765, 776-77 (N.D.
Ill. 1982), af'd, 712 F.2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983). The plaintiff, a
licensee of the defendant, alleged that it was a potential entrant into a new geographic mar-
ket, but that the defendant's acquisition of a licensee in that market foreclosed the plaintiffs
entry. Because the plaintiff was only a potential competitor in the market in which the ac-
quired licensee was located, and not an actual competitor, the court decided that the plaintiff
was not in the target area of the acquisition and therefore lacked standing to sue. Id. at 774-
76. See also Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 543 F. Supp. 1255 (W.D. La. 1982),
aff'd, 725 F.2d 300 (1984) (summary judgment granted to defendant when plaintiff, alleging
foreclosure, presented evidence of the increased efficiency of the post-merger defendant).
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tive markets, there will be some realignment of buyers and sellers, but
there will not be any foreclosure. 00 Furthermore, under certain cir-
cumstances the retail store may not purchase all of its requirements
from the merged supplier. If the post-merger firm is a profit-maximiz-
ing firm, it will purchase from the merged supplier only if that supplier
is the lowest-cost source of supply.101
Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A. G 102 illustrates the fore-
closure theory. Volkswagen acquired Delanair, a company that manu-
factured and supplied its dealers with automobile air conditioners.10 3
Volkswagen's status as a monopolist (actually, a monopsonist) 1°4 was
established by a jury finding that the relevant market was air condition-
ers for Volkswagen automobiles. 05 The plaintiff also manufactured air
conditioners for Volkswagens. It alleged that as a result of the acquisi-
tion the defendant purchased all of its air conditioners from Delanair
to the exclusion of the plaintiff.10 6
The foreclosure theory is most plausible when one of the merging
firms is a monopolist. 10 7 Even in that case, however, it is not obvious
how vertical integration can injure consumers. Volkswagen could com-
pletely foreclose other firms from the market for Volkswagen air condi-
tioners by acquiring an air conditioning manufacturer. 10 8 But that
100. See4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW T 1004, at 223-24 (1980). Areeda
and Turner find "that the foreclosure theory has grave weaknesses." Id. at 221. See also R.
BORK, supra note 23, at 231-34.
101. If all suppliers are equally efficient but the vertical merger reduces transaction costs
between the two merging firms, then it would be to their advantage to deal only with each
other. Such transactional economies probably explain the vast majority of vertical mergers.
See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS 90-95 (1975); Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act. The Legal Historr /ofan
Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 195 (1954); Williamson, Antitrust Revisited,
supra note 24, at 723-26.
102. 553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978). See also Calnetics
Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
940 (1976).
103. 553 F.2d at 974-75. Volkswagen of America, Volkswagenwerk's subsidiary in the
United States, acquired Delanair. Id
104. A monopsonist is a monopoly buyer.
105. 553 F.2d at 970-71, 981.
106. Id. at 974.
107. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at §§ 7.2-7.3.
108. However, the plaintiff did not show that either Volkswagenwerk, the automobile
manufacturer, or its retail dealers had any market power in automobiles generally or in air-
conditioned automobiles. To be sure, a monopsonist in one market who resells as a compet-
itor in a different market can maximize its profits by reducing output. Assume, for example,
that Volkswagen sold automobiles in a competitive market at $5,000 and that it would pay
$500 for air conditioners from independent manufacturers in a competitive market. Because
Volkswagen is a monopsonist it can reduce its buying rate and obtain a lower price; perhaps
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alone does not make the merger anticompetitive. As a profit-maximiz-
ing firm, Volkswagen is still motivated to deal with the most efficient
producer of air conditioners, even if it happens to own a different
producer. 109
Regardless of whether vertical integration by a monopolist is so-
cially detrimental, the plaintiff who is injured because its competitor
was acquired by a monopolist has a cause of action under the Sherman
Act." l0 Indeed, the plaintiff in Heatransfer would have suffered pre-
cisely the same injury had Volkswagen built its own air conditioning
manufacturer from scratch. The determination of whether Volks-
wagen's vertical integration was socially beneficial or detrimental had
nothing to do with the fact that the integration was carried out by
means of a merger."' The plaintiff did not suffer "antitrust injury"
from a section 7 violation.
Private plaintiffs conceivably might attack a vertical merger on
two additional theories, provided that one of the parties to the merger
it can then maximize its mark-up on air-conditioned automobiles by buying fewer air condi-
tioners and selling fewer air-conditioned Volkswagens. The resulting reduction in output
would produce allocative inefficiencies analogous to the consequences of monopoly. For a
technical description of how monopsony works when the monopsony buyer resells in a com-
petitive market, see J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHE-
MATICAL APPROACH 190-92 (3d ed. 1980).
Even assuming that Volkswagen was exercising monopsony power in the market for
Volkswagen air conditioners before the acquisition, the tendency of the acquisition would be
to restore output to the competitive level; it would not be profitable for Volkswagen to force
its own subsidiary to sell to it at a less-than-competitive price. In any case, however, an
exercise of monopsony power, whether by vertical integration or otherwise, is just as illegal
under § 2 of the Sherman Act as an exercise of monopoly power, and a plaintiff injured by
the anticompetitive consequences of such an exercise would have a cause of action, either for
monopolization or for attempt to monopolize. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375 (1905).
109. See R. BORK, supra note 23, at 227.
110. In Heatransfer, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff under the
Sherman Act as well as under § 7 of the Clayton Act. 553 F.2d at 981-82.
111. In Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 491 F. Supp. 1199,
1223-25 (D. Hawaii 1980), aF'd, 732 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1984), the court dismissed a merger
action because the fact of the merger was irrelevant to the injury alleged. In that case the
plaintiff, in the business of renting cars, alleged that the defendant injured it by acquiring
competing rental car companies and then assembling "fly-drive" packages under which pas-
sengers on Aloha Airlines could obtain rental cars at a low rate. Although the theory under
which the plaintiff sued is unclear, it is likely that the defendant was using the fly-drive
packages to avoid the price regulation of airline tickets. By combining the airline and rental
car rates, the defendant was able to compete in an area where price regulation had set the
fares higher than they would have been in a competitive market. The court dismissed the
merger count for lack of a showing that the acquisition itself facilitated the fly-drive arrange-
ments; similar arrangements could also be obtained with rental car agencies that had not
been acquired by the defendant. Id. at 1224-25.
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is a monopolist. First, the plaintiff can allege that the monopolist is
using its monopoly at one distributional level to gain another monop-
oly at a second distributional level."12 Second, the plaintiff can charge
that the monopolist is making entry into the market more difficult by
forcing a new entrant to enter at both distributional levels
simultaneously. "13
The first theory has no merit in logic or economics. A monopolist
might in fact be able to use vertical integration to create a second mo-
nopoly, but unless the monopolist is price-regulated"14 it will not be
able to extract any more monopoly profits from the two stages of distri-
bution together than it could from one alone.' '5 A single monopolist in
a distribution chain can extract all the monopoly profits available, be-
cause the customers at the end of the chain determine the monopoly
price. If the profit-maximizing retail price for shoes is $40.00 a pair,
but the marginal cost of producing them in a market in which all distri-
bution levels are competitive is $30.00, a single monopolist at any level
will be able to extract the entire $10.00 in monopoly profits." 6
112. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at §§ 7.2-7.3.
113. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-24 (1962); 3 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW $ 725h, at 204-08 (1978); see also Note, Refusals to Deal by
Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1720, 1726 (1974).
114. A price-regulated firm might use vertical integration to avoid the price regulation
and reap monopoly profits otherwise unavailable to it. For example, a price-regulated tele-
phone line company might acquire telephone operating and equipment companies because
it could more easily hide profits. That is, it could charge itself higher prices for the equip-
ment and use these higher prices to create a higher base from which rates would be com-
puted. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 984 (1983); International Tel. & Tel. Co. v. General Tel. & Tel. Co., 518 F.2d 913
(9th Cir. 1975). In such a case the foreclosure argument is more plausible, particularly if the
price-regulated defendant has a legal monopoly in the price-regulated market. The rate
avoidance scheme gives the price-regulated monopolist a motive to buy from its subsidiary
even though the subsidiary is not the most efficient seller.
115. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 725b, at 199 (1978); R. POSNER,
supra note 16, at 197. However, a firm might be able to use vertical integration in order to
engage in price discrimination, thereby enlarging its monopoly profits. 3 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 201 (1978). In most cases of imperfect price discrimination, how-
ever, there is no way to predict whether the discrimination will generate higher or lower
output. See J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 201-02 (1933).
Bork agrees. R. BORK, supra note 23, at 240. In any case, persistent price discrimination is
not possible unless the discriminating seller has market power.
As Areeda and Turner note, reciprocal buying arrangements resulting from conglomer-
ate mergers can also facilitate price discrimination. See 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 1129d, at 166-67 (1980).
116. If, however, a monopolist merges vertically with another monopolist, the result will
be higher output and lower prices than existed when the two firms were independent. See 3
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 725c, at 200 (1978); 4 P. AREEDA & D. TUR-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW 1012b, at 255-57 (1980).
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The second theory, that vertical mergers may raise anticompetitive
entry barriers, may be plausible in some circumstances, although com-
mentators have expressed doubts. 17 Perhaps a monopolist can en-
trench its monopoly position by monopolizing a second link in the
distribution chain. Anyone who wanted to invade the monopolist's ter-
ritory would then have to enter at both levels. 1 8
Even assuming that these theories are plausible, however, both
state a cause of action under section 2 of the Sherman Act for monopo-
lization or attempt to monopolize. If a competitor of a company ac-
quired by a monopolist is foreclosed from the market, the results may
be anticompetitive. Such anticompetitive foreclosure can only occur,
however, in a market in which one of the parties to the vertical merger
already has market power. In such a case, the party injured by the
foreclosure has a cause of action for monopolization." 9 It is irrelevant
whether there has been an illegal merger under section 7, because the
injury would be the same whether the integration were by merger or by
new entry. 120 The real issue is whether the foreclosure is anticompeti-
tive. The law of monopolization, not the law of mergers, is best
designed to resolve that issue.
Conglomerate Mergers
The most serious abuses of section 7 have occurred in private ac-
tions seeking damages for illegal conglomerate mergers. Such cases are
prime targets for the application of Brunswick's antitrust injury doc-
trine. Conglomerate merger actions have always been the most difficult
to sustain, but courts on occasion have found antitrust violations, most
generally under the "perceived potential entrant" theory. 12'
A merger is illegal under the perceived potential entrant theory if
the merger involves a firm that was perceived by incumbents in a con-
centrated market to be a potential entrant.' 22 So long as a potential
117. See R. BORK, supra note 23, at 240-41 (expressing doubt about whether a monopo-
list can deter entry by vertical integration).
118. Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982
(1978). See also Freuhauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352 (2d Cir. 1979) (refusing to enjoin
a merger under the entry barriers theory).
119. See, e.g., Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 981-82 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978).
120. See generally Note, supra note 113, at 1725-32 (discussing economic harm from
vertical integration).
121. See, eg., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 625, 638-39 (1974);
Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915
(1982).
122. The perceived potential entrant theory is not the only theory under which conglom-
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entrant remains on the edge of the market, firms within the market
presumably charge a price low enough to deter the potential entrant
from entering. If the potential entrant acquires a firm already in the
market, however, it no longer presents a threat and the firms within the
market can raise their prices without concern about entry from that
particular firm. 123
The effects of a conglomerate merger under the perceived poten-
tial entrant theory more closely resemble those of a horizontal merger
than those of a vertical merger. The conglomerate merger increases the
collective market power of the firms already in the market by reducing
the market's elasticity of supply. 124 In a market with a tendency to-
ward oligopoly pricing, the prices would be higher after a merger.
If the theory is valid, a customer of the post-merger firm should
have a cause of action under section 7 for the overcharge if it is able to
show that it was forced to pay a monopoly price because a conglomer-
ate merger eliminated a perceived potential entrant. There appear to
be no such cases.
Competitors of the merging firm will benefit if the merger is illegal
under the theory claimed for it. For example, if A, B, and C are oligo-
polists in some market whose pricing is restrained by a potential en-
trant, X, both B and C will benefit from X's acquisition of A. The
potential entrant will be removed from the entire market, and B and C
as well as the post-merger firm X-A will be able to increase their prices.
erate mergers are challenged. Some mergers are challenged under an actual potential en-
trant theory. Under this theory a merger that has no immediate anticompetitive effects may
nevertheless be adjudged anticompetitive in the long run if the acquiring firm could have
entered the market de novo or by acquisition of a fringe firm in the market. This is because
the merger will have precluded entry by the acquiring firm in a manner which would have
rendered the market more competitive, rather than less competitive.
There have not been, and likely never will be, successful private actions under the ac-
tual potential entrant theory, although occasionally the courts have applied the theory in
actions brought by the FTC. See Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 980 (8th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638
F.2d 1255, 1265 (5th Cir. 1981) (review of Federal Reserve Board order). Inherent in the
theory is a concession that the merger causes no immediate anticompetitive injury.
Other conglomerate mergers have been challenged under the theory that they may fa-
cilitate reciprocal buying. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594-95
(1965).
123. For a more complete description of the theory of potential competition mergers, see
5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1116-1126, at 69-161 (1980); Brodley, Po-
tential Competition Mergers: 4 Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 8-30 (1977).
124. The elimination of a likely entrant either reduces the likelihood of or increases the
time in which new entry will occur in response to a non-cost-justified price increase. As the
elasticity of supply goes down, the incumbents' profit-maximizing price goes up. See Landes
& Posner, supra note 63, at 945-46.
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On the other hand, if the merger increases the efficiency of the
post-merger firm, allowing it to increase output and sell at a lower
price, then the competitors of the merging firm will be injured by the
merger, although consumers will be better off. Under such circum-
stances, the competitor should be foreclosed from bringing suit under
section 7; the competitor has clearly not suffered antitrust injury.
In the leading Supreme Court case condemning a conglomerate
merger under the perceived potential entrant theory, FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co.,' 25 the acquiring firm (Proctor & Gamble) was a manufac-
turer of various household cleaning products not including bleach, and
the acquired firm (Clorox) manufactured nothing but bleach. The
Supreme Court found that Proctor & Gamble was a potential de novo
entrant into the household bleach market and that its presence at the
edge of the market had a competitive influence on price in the bleach
market.1 26 The acquisition eliminated that potential competition.
Justice Douglas' opinion in Procter & Gamble has been attacked as
condemning the acquisition because it created certain efficiencies.' 27
The Court condemned the merger, not because it would have increased
the market price of bleach (which would injure consumers but benefit
Clorox's competitors in bleach manufacturing), but because Clorox
would have had the advantage of Procter & Gamble's large marketing
and distribution system and quantity discounts in advertising, which
would have given Clorox a cost advantage over its competitors. 28
If the Proctor & Gamble merger was condemned for this reason,
then a competing bleach manufacturer in the post-Brunswick era
should not have a damages action against either Proctor & Gamble or
Clorox. A private plaintiff may not complain that it was injured by the
increased efficiency of the post-merger firm.' 29
The Ninth Circuit lost sight of Brunswick when it decided Purex
Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,' 30 a private damages action that arose in
the wake of the Supreme Court's divestiture order in Procter & Gamble.
Purex, a competitor of Clorox in the sale of bleach, brought a private
action for damages, alleging that it had been injured by the illegal
125. 386 U.S. 568, 571, 572 (1967). The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and
affirmed an FTC order that Proctor & Gamble divest Clorox. Id at 581. Divestiture was
completed in 1969. Purex Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 596 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1979).
126. 386 U.S. at 577-78, 581.
127. See R. BORK, supra note 23, at 254-55; R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 118-20.
128. 386 U.S. at 579-81. See supra notes 79-81 & accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 79-81 & accompanying text.
130. 596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979).
July 1984] MERGER ACTIONS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
merger of Proctor & Gamble and Clorox.131
In Purex the plaintiff alleged that it was injured in several ways.
First, Purex alleged that the defendant's acquisition of Clorox "reduced
competition in the industry because Clorox acquired access to the vast
marketing resources of Procter & Gamble, including advertising dis-
counts, preferred media positions, market research, packaging capabil-
ity and experienced personnel."' 32 In response, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted Brunswick to require 1) that the merger have anti-competi-
tive effects, or that anti-competitive acts are facilitated by the merger;
and 2) that the plaintiff has been injured by these effects or acts. 33
Then, in a particularly opaque statement, the Court concluded:
For instance, Procter's acquisition may have increased Clorox's effi-
ciency, as the district court found, by enhancing Clorox's marketing
resources and by making substantial advertising discounts available.
Although such economies may be unobjectionable in isolation, they
may be the basis of Section 4 liability if they serve as part of the
mechanism by which an illegal merger lessens competition.' 34
The Ninth Circuit's statement that economies can be "the mecha-
nism by which an illegal merger lessens competition" is absolutely in-
consistent with Brunswick on the very point for which that case was
decided. This was a complaint about more competition, not less, in the
bleach industry.
Purex's theories of injury present an interesting hodge-podge,
however, and deserve some analysis. For example, Purex alleged that
post-merger Clorox engaged in false advertising.135 However, such an
allegation is irrelevant to the legality of the merger, whether or not the
activity was anticompetitive. To be sure, a merger could facilitate de-
ceptive advertising. For example, it might result in new management
that has fewer scruples about misleading advertising than the old man-
agement had. But the injury is not "caused" by an illegal merger; it is
not even "caused" by a change of management. It is caused by false
advertising, and Purex should be required to plead accordingly.
A more interesting allegation was that after the merger Procter &
13 1. Id. at 883. The Supreme Court's opinion in Proctor & Gamble had foreclosed any
reasonable argument that the merger itself had been legal. See Purex Corp. v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 453 F.2d 288, 290 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972); see also
supra note 90 (discussion of collateral estoppel).
132. 596 F.2d at 884. This allegation should have been dismissed for failure to state a
claim. It appears on its face to be a complaint about the defendant's increased efficiency, not
about its anticompetitive exclusionary practices. See supra text accompanying note 79.
133. 596 F.2d at 887.
134. Id. at 888.
135. d at 885.
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Gamble sold Clorox bleach at a predatorily low price.1 36 The notion
that a merger can facilitate predatory pricing is questionable.
1 37
Although predatory pricing requires a deep pocket, and the resources
of the acquiring firm may provide one, the merger itself has little bear-
ing on whether predatory pricing is a rational activity in a particular
instance. That determination depends upon the structure of the market
in which the alleged predatory pricing takes place. 38
More important, however, is the question of whether Purex was
injured by predatory pricing or merely by lower prices reflecting in-
creased efficiencies. That determination requires analysis of the rela-
tionship between the defendant's prices and its costs. 139 Purex also
alleged that it was injured by the merger because post-merger Clorox
was able to take advantage of certain production and transactional
economies that were not available to the plaintiff. This allegation sug-
gests that the efficiencies created by the merger may have enabled the
defendant to lower its price. To permit recovery for an illegal merger
136. Id. at 884. The district court found that Clorox did engage in "below-cost" pricing
after the acquisition; however, it was "localized and temporary." Id. at 885.
137. But see infra note 138. Courts have occasionally suggested the possibility of con-
demning mergers on the theory that they facilitate predatory pricing. See Reynolds Metals
Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. Aluminum Co., 233 F.
Supp. 718, 727-28 (E.D. Mo. 1964), a f'd, 382 U.S. 12 (1965). In general, there is little reason
to believe that a firm is more likely to engage in predatory pricing after a merger than it was
before. In any case, a court must analyze the relationship between the defendant's prices
and costs before it can determine whether a price is predatory. See generally 5 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW % 1136, at 219-24 (1980) (discussing predatory pricing and
mergers). Plaintiffs have also sometimes complained that vertical mergers facilitated preda-
tory pricing. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 211 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
138. If a market contains three firms, A, B, & C, it is easier for post-merger firm A-B to
engage in successful predatory pricing against C than for A acting alone to do so against
both B and C. This is true particularly if the firms are of roughly equal size. In general, a
firm with a large market share can engage in predatory pricing more cheaply than can a firm
with a small market share, because a proportionately smaller increase in the larger firm's
output would have a proportionately larger impact on the victim. For example, if the
predator has 80% of a market and the victim 20%, a 10% increase in the predator's output
would reduce the victim's output by 40% (ignoring customers who enter the market at the
predatory price, but who were not purchasing at all at the competitive price). On the other
hand, if two firms share a market equally, a 50% increase in output by the predator would
result in only a 50% decrease in sales by the victim. Before a merger would make predatory
pricing significantly easier, however, the increase in market share must be substantial, much
more than § 7 permits. Finally, the theory that a post-merger firm's larger market share can
facilitate predatory pricing applies only to horizontal mergers. In vertical mergers and in
conglomerate mergers such as Procter-Clorox, the post-merger firm does not occupy a larger
share of any market than it did before, except insofar as post-merger efficiencies enable it to
lower its price and increase its output.
139. See5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1136, at 219-24 (1980).
July 19841 MERGER ACTIONS
under such a theory strikes at the heart of the antitrust injury
doctrine. 140
To recover for its alleged injury, the plaintiff should be required to
show that the defendant's post-merger price was predatory-designed
to drive rivals from the market so that the defendant could price mo-
nopolistically in the future. 14 1 In Purex, however, the court apparently
assumed that the existence of either an illegal merger or low-priced
sales made by a newly-merged company required a different analysis
from the court's accepted analysis for predatory pricing. 42 While the
Ninth Circuit has expressed its dissatisfaction with the current tests for
determining whether pricing is predatory, 143 the court offered no rea-
son for applying one standard to a post-merger firm and a different
standard in the absence of a recent merger. The irrationality of apply-
ing a different standard is underscored by the fact that a post-merger
price decrease can be expected if the merger creates substantial efficien-
cies. When a rival suddenly lowers its price we can infer one of three
things: (1) the price was monopolistic before it was lowered; (2) the
firm has found some new source of efficiency that enables it to sell at a
lower price; or (3) the new price is predatory. The one significant dif-
ference between an allegation of price predation in the wake of a
140. See supra notes 79-81 & accompanying text.
141. In a circuit that has adopted the Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing, 3 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 709-722, at 148-94 (1980), the plaintiff would
have to show that the defendant's prices were below its average variable cost. The Ninth
Circuit has adopted a variation of the Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing. See Trans-
america Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1384-86 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 370 (1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1034-36 (9th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); Janich Bros. v. American
Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 857-59 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson
v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977);
see also California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1979).
See generally Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, supra note 76.
142. The court was ambiguous on the point. Several times the opinion refers to sales
"below cost," but fails to indicate which cost figure is relevant. The Ninth Circuit remanded
the case to the district court so that a more complete record could be produced, but it did not
suggest a rule for evaluating the post-merger firm's "below cost" selling. Purex Corp. v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 596 F.2d 881, 889 (9th Cir. 1979). On remand the district court
concluded that Purex's injuries were in fact self-inflicted, Purex Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 664 F.2d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982), and that, in any
case, its profits increased steadily during the entire period in which the alleged injuries oc-
curred. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision without discussing conduct standards for
the post-merger firm. Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co. 664 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982).
143. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1385-86 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983) (court rejecting the per se aspects of the Areeda-
Turner test).
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merger and a predatory pricing allegation of the ordinary variety is that
in the former the efficiency explanation comes immediately to mind,
while in the latter it does not. If a merger does not yield immediate
market power, we can expect it to yield certain efficiences; lower prices
may follow. 44
The same considerations apply to Clorox's other promotional ac-
tivities. To be sure, there may be circumstances in which the introduc-
tion of a new product or service, or of an existing product or service
into a new area, may be predatory. 45 However, the fact that it is done
shortly after a merger gives us no special reason for thinking that it is
predatory and certainly no reason for applying a different test to deter-
mine if it was.
Perhaps a product extension merger such as Procter & Gamble's
could facilitate certain package sales or reciprocity arrangements be-
tween Clorox and its parent company. For example, if Procter & Gam-
ble manufactured household detergent, it might sell or promote
detergent and Clorox bleach as a "package" after the merger. Such
activity could injure a competitor in the market for the tied product.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act,' 46 however, is designed to measure di-
rectly the competitive effects of such product packaging and to draw
the line between those arrangements that are competitive and those
that are anticompetitive. '47 The nature of the economic analysis does
not change simply because the defendant's package was facilitated by a
merger. The law of tying arrangements is better designed than the law
of mergers to determine whether a particular package sale is
anticompetitive. 148
144. For a more reasonable, although incomplete, analysis of an allegation that a merger
facilitated predatory pricing, see Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 543 F. Supp. 1255,
1267-69 (W.D. La. 1982), affd, 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1984).
145. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983); 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 716, at 176-78
(1978); Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 730-32 (1975); Ordover & Willig, An Economic Defini-
tion of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 22-23 (1981).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
147. The plaintiffs burden is a difficult one because the vast majority of tie-ins create
efficiency. See R. BORK, supra note 23, at 365-81; Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and
Class Actions, 36 VAND. L. REV. 213, 252-58 (1983). See generally Bowman, Tying Arrange-
ments and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line
Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960); Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An
Economic Anaysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 552 (1965); Note, Reciprocal Dealing, 76
YALE L.J. 1020 (1967).
148. Areeda and Turner discuss at some length the potential for conglomerate mergers
to facilitate tie-ins, reciprocity, and exclusive dealing. 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTI-
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Conclusion
The private damages action for illegal mergers could be abolished
with little loss of integrity to the federal antitrust enforcement scheme.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, however, appears not to permit such abo-
lition. Nevertheless, a consumer-oriented antitrust policy will approve
mergers likely to be socially beneficial and condemn them only when
they are likely to be socially harmful.
The line between efficient and harmful mergers is ambiguous,
however, so ambiguous that no good case can be made for an "effi-
ciency defense" or for any judicial balancing of the efficiency effects of
a particular merger against its market power effects. The public en-
forcement agencies, the DOJ and the FTC, are required to redress pub-
lic injuries. Presumably they will not challenge an ambiguous merger
unless they have made some calculation that the merger is, on balance,
socially harmful. A private plaintiff, however, makes no such calcula-
tion. Private persons seeking damages sue in order to redress private
injuries, and both the efficiency effects and the market power effects of
mergers cause private injuries.
As a result, a substantial divergence exists between the plaintiff's
motive for bringing a merger action and the public policy against an-
ticompetitive mergers. This divergence encourages unprincipled fil-
ings-that is, complaints that will remedy private injuries by causing
social injuries. Condemnation of a socially beneficial merger is just as
costly to society as the failure to condemn a socially harmful merger.
Unprincipled filings plus the ambiguity and complexity of substantive
merger law increases the likelihood of such socially harmful
overdeterrence.
The solution to the problem of unprincipled private damages ac-
tions for illegal mergers lies in the 'antitrust injury' doctrine formulated
TRUST LAW 1128-1139, at 162-231 (1980). In general, they conclude that the law should
ignore mergers that show merely a "potential" for reciprocity, but should become involved
when reciprocity actually results. Id. at 180. They note that the requirement in tie-in cases
of a "not insubstantial" dollar volume of commerce in the tied product before condemning
the tie-in is not applied in merger cases that threaten reciprocity. Thus, at least theoretically,
a merger whose only anticompetitive effect was to facilitate tie-ins could be condemned,
even though the dollar volume of interstate commerce involved was too small for the tie-in
to be condemned under § 3 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 195. The upper limit on the dollar
volume for this class of cases is suggested by the Supreme Court's indication that annual
sales of $60,000 are sufficient to activate § 3. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49
(1962). At least one district court has found sales of $50,000 to be sufficient for § 1 of the
Sherman Act. Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430, 435-36
(E.D. Pa. 1976). Whether a merger involving sales that small would be illegal under § 7 is
doubtful unless the geographic market was very small.
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by the Supreme Court in Brunswick. Here, a broadened and stronger
version of that doctrine is proposed. The private antitrust plaintiff, un-
like the public enforcement agencies, must shoW not only that a merger
that is illegal under current substantive law has taken place, but in or-
der to collect damages it must show how it was injured. If the private
plaintiff was injured by the post-merger firm's increased efficiency, the
complaint should be dismissed for failure of antitrust injury.
Further, if the plaintiff claims an injury caused by an anticompeti-
tive post-merger practice, it becomes important to consider the nature
of the practice and its relationship to the merger itself. On the one
hand, the victim of an overcharge caused by a merger-to-monopoly
ought to have a cause of action for its overcharge injury. On the other
hand, the allegation that a merger facilitated some other kind of an-
ticompetitive practice invariably reduces to the allegation that the
merger facilitated a secondary antitrust violation. In such circum-
stances the ambiguous welfare effects of marginally illegal mergers dic-
tate that the plaintiff be required to prove the facilitated secondary
violation. If it can do so, then proof of an illegal merger is irrelevant,
and the section 7 claim should be dismissed. If it cannot, then the in-
ference is strong that the plaintiff has been injured by the post-merger
firm's increased efficiency, and its complaint should be dismissed.
July 1984] MERGER ACTIONS

